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Abstract 
In a recent UEFA Champions League game between AC Milan and FC Barcelona, 
played in Italy (final score 2-3), the collected match statistics, classified into four 
offensive and two defensive strategies, were in favour of FC Barcelona (by 13 versus 
8 points). The aim of this paper is to examine to what extent the optimal game 
strategies derived from some deterministic, possibilistic, stochastic and fuzzy LP 
models would improve the payoff of AC Milan at the cost of FC Barcelona.  
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1. Introduction  
 
The main objective of the teams’ managers is to find their optimal strategies to win 
the match. Thus, it should be appropriate to use game theory to analyze a football 
match. Moreover, as always with game applications, the access of accurate data to 
estimate the payoffs of the selected strategies is very difficult. According to Carlton & 
Perloff (2005), only a few mixed strategy models have been estimated in Industrial 
Economics. In addition to that, contrary to professional business managers who have 
a solid managerial, mathematic or economic education, team managers lack the 
necessary formal knowledge to use the game theoretic methods. Football managers, 
when they decide their most appropriate tactical move or strategy, rely more on their 
a-priori beliefs, intuition, attitude towards risk and experience.  
In a football game if we exclude fortune and simple mistakes, by players and referees 
as well, goals scored or conceived are often the results of good offensive and/or bad 
defensive tactics and strategies. There are a varying number of strategies and tactics. 
As is well known, tactics are the means to achieve the objectives, while strategy is a 
set of decisions formulated before the game starts (or during the half-time brake), 
specifying the tactical moves the team will follow during the match, depending upon 
various circumstances. For instance, the basic elements of a team’s tactics are: which 
players will play the game, which tasks they will perform, where they will be 
positioned and how the team will be formed and reformed in the pitch. Similarly, a 
team’s strategies might be to play a short passing game with a high ball possession, 
attacking with the ball moving quickly and pressing high up its competitors, while 
another team’s strategy might be to defend with a zonal or a man-to-man system, 
and using the speed of its fullbacks to attack, or playing long passes and crosses as a 
counter attacking (see http://www.talkfootball.co.uk/guides/football_tactics.html).  
Consequently, both managers need somehow to guess correctly how the opponents 
will play in order to be successful. Needless to say, all decisions made by humans are 
vulnerable to any cognitive biases and are not perfect when they try to make true 
predictions.  
Not only the number of tactics and strategies in a football match is large, their 
measures are very hard indeed. How can one define and measure correctly “counter 
attacks”, “high pressure”, “attacking game”, “long passes”, “runs” etc?  The existing 
data on match-statistics cover relatively “easy” variables, like: “ball possession”, 
“shots on target”, “fouls committed”, “corners”, “offside” and “yellow” or “red 
cards”, (see for instance UEFA’s official site 
http://www.uefa.com/uefachampionsleague/season=2012/statistics/index.html).  
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If one wants to measure the appropriate teams’ strategies or tactics, one has to collect 
such measures, which is obviously an extremely time-consuming task, especially if a 
“statistically” large sample of matches, where the same teams are involved, is 
required. In this case-study, I have collected detailed statistics from just one match, a 
UEFA Champions League group match, between AC Milan (ACM) and FC Barcelona 
(FCB), held in Milan on November 23, 2011, where FCB defeated ACM by 3-2. 
Despite the fact that both teams were practically qualified before the game, the game 
had more a prestigious character and would determine to a large extent, which team 
would be the winner of the group. Given the fact that I have concentrated on six 
strategies per team, four offensives and two defensive, and that FCB wins over ACM 
in more strategy pairs, the aim of this paper is indeed to examine to what extent the 
optimal game strategies derived from some deterministic, possibilistic and fuzzy LP 
models would improve the payoff of ACM. 
Obviously, there are two shortages with the use of such match statistics. First, we 
can’t blame the teams or their managers for not using their optimal pure or mixed 
strategies, if the payoffs from the selected strategies were not known in advance, but 
were observed when the game was being played. Second, it is unfair to blame the 
manager of ACM (the looser), if his players did not follow the correct strategies 
suggested by him. It is also unfair to give credits to the manager of FCB (the winner), 
if his players did not follow the (possibly) incorrect strategies suggested by him. 
Thus, we modify the purpose and try to find out the optimal strategies, assuming 
that the payoffs were anticipated by the managers and the players did what they 
have been asked to do. 
On the other hand, the merits of this case-study are to treat a football match not as a 
trivial zero-sum game, but as a non-constant sum game, or a bi-matrix game, with 
many strategies. It is not the goal scored itself that is analyzed, but merely under 
which mixed offensive and defensive strategies the teams (and especially ACM) 
could have done better and collected more payoffs. As is known, in such games, it is 
rather difficult to find a solution that is simultaneously optimal for both teams, 
unless one assumes that both teams will have Nash beliefs about each other. Given 
the uncertainty in measures of some or all selected strategies, possibilistic and fuzzy 
formulations are also presented. 
The structure of the paper consists of five sections: In section 2 we discuss the 
selected strategies and how we measured them. In section 3, using the payoffs from 
section 2, we formulate the following models: (i) classical optimization; (ii) maximum 
of minimum payoffs; (iii) LP with complementary constraints; (iv) Nash; (v) Chance 
Constrained LP; (vi) Possibilistic LP; (vii) Fuzzy LP. In section 4 we present and 
comment on the results from all models and section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Selected strategies and Data 
FCB and ACM are two world-wide teams who play a very attractive football. They 
use almost similar team formations, the 4-3-3 system (four defenders, three 
midfielders and three attackers). All football fans know that FCB’s standard strategy 
is to play an excellent passing game, with high ball possession, and quick movements 
when it attacks. According to official match statistics, FCB had 60% ball possession, 
even if a large part of the ball was kept away from ACM’s defensive area. All 
managers who face FCB expect that to happen, and knowing that FCB has the 
world’s best player, Messi, they must decide in advance some defensive tactics to 
neutralize him.  
Since the official match statistics are not appropriate for our selected strategies1, I 
recorded the game and played it back several times in order to measure all 
interesting pairs of payoffs. Both teams are assumed to play the following six 
strategies: (i) shots on goal, (ii) counter-attacks, (iii) attacking passes, (iv) dribbles, (v) 
tackling and (vi) zone marking. The first four reflect offensive strategies and the last 
two defensive strategies. Needless to say that most of these variables are hard to 
observe (and measure). It is assumed that the payoffs from all these strategies are 
equally worth. One can of course put different weights. 
(i) shots on goal (SG) 
Teams with many SG, are expected to score more goals. In a previous study 
(Papahristodoulou, 2008), based on 814 UEFA CL matches, it was estimated that 
teams need, on average, about 4 SG to score a goal.  
In this paper all SG count, irrespectively if they saved by the goalkeeper or the 
defenders, as long as they are directed towards the target, and irrespectively of the 
distance, the power of the shot and the angle they were kicked2. SG from fouls, 
corners and head-nicks are also included.  
According to the official match statistics, FCB had 6 SG and 3 corners. According to 
my own definition, FCB had 14 SG. The defenders of ACM blocked 13 of them 
(including the 4 savings by the goal-keeper).  One of the shots was turned into goal, 
by Xavi. On the other hand, the other two goals scored do not count as SG, because 
the first was by penalty (Messi) and the other by own goal (van Bommel). Similarly, 
according to the official match statistics, ACM had 3 SG and 4 corners, while in my 
                                                           
1 Since a game theoretic terminology is applied, we use the term “strategy” in the entire 
paper, even if we refer to tactics. 
2 Pollard and Reep (1997) estimated that the scoring probability is 24% higher for every yard 
nearer goal and the scoring probability doubles when a player manages to be over 1 yard 
from an opponent when shooting the ball. 
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measures ACM had 13 SG. FCB blocked 11 of them (including a good saving by its 
goal-keeper), and two of them turned into goals (by Ibrahimovic and Boateng).  
(ii) counter-attacks (CA) 
The idea with CA is to benefit from the other team’s desperation to score, despite its 
offensive game. The defendant team is withdrawn into its own half but keep a man 
or two further up the pitch. If many opponent players attack and loose the ball, they 
will be out of position and the defendant team has more space to deliver a long-ball 
for the own strikers, or own players can run relatively free to the competitors’ 
defensive area and probably score. This tactic is rather risky, but it will work if the 
defendant team has a reliant and solid defense, and excellent runners and/or ball 
kickers. 
In this study CA have been defined as those which have started from the own 
defense area and continued all the way to the other team’s penalty area. On the other 
hand, a slow pace with passes and/or the existence of more defenders than attackers 
in their correct position do not count.  
According to that definition, FCB had 15 CA and ACM 13.  
(iii) attacking passes (AP) 
The golden rule in football is to “pass and move quickly”. There are not many teams 
which handle to apply it successfully though. FCB mainly, and ACM to a less extent, 
are two teams which are known to play an entertaining game with a very large 
number of successful passes. In a recent paper (Papahristodoulou, 2010) it was 
estimated that ACM, in an average match, could achieve about 500 successful passes 
and have a ball possession of more than 60%. (For all Italian teams see for instance, 
http://sport.virgilio.it/calcio/serie-a/statistiche/index.html). Similarly in a 
previous study (Papahristodoulou, 2008), FCB achieved even higher ball possession. 
Moreover, very often, the players choose the easiest possible pass, and many times 
one observes defenders passing the ball along the defensive line.  
There is a simple logic behind this apparently attractive strategy. By keeping hold of 
the ball with passes, the opponents get frustrated, try to chase all over the pitch, get 
tired and disposed and consequently leave open spaces for the opponent quick 
attackers to score.   
Given the fact that the number of passes is very large, compared to the other 
observations, the payoff game matrix will be extremely unbalanced and both teams 
would simply play their dominant AP strategy. To make the game less trivial, I have 
used a very restrictive definition of AP, assuming the following criteria are fulfilled:  
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Only successful passes and head-nicks which start at most approximately 15 meters 
outside the defendant team’s penalty area count.  
The passes and head-nicks should be directed forward to the targeted team-player 
who must be running forward too (i.e. passes to static players are excluded). 
Backward passes count as long as they take place within the penalty area only. 
Neither long crosses, nor passes from free kicks and corners count. 
Consequently, FCB had 17 successful AP and ACM had 13 ones. ACM managed to 
defend successfully 14 times while FCB defended successfully every third pass that 
ACM attempted. 
(iv) dribbles (D) 
Dribbling, i.e. the action to pass the ball around one or more defenders through short 
skillful taps or kicks, can take place anywhere in the pitch. Moreover, since D in this 
paper is treated as offensive strategy, only the offensive ones are of interest. The 
action will be measured if it starts no more than 15 meters outside the defendant 
team’s penalty area and the player must move forward. Dribbling counts even if the 
player turns backward, as long as he remains within the penalty area. If the offensive 
player manages to dribble more than one player but with different actions 
subsequently, the number of D increases analogically.  
According to that definition, each team had 14 D. 
(v) tackling (T) 
A standard defensive strategy is to tackle the opponents in order to stop them from 
gaining ground towards goal, or stop their SG, AP and their D. Tackling is defined 
when the defender uses either his left or right leg (but not both legs) to wrest 
possession from his opponent. Even sliding in on the grass to knock the ball away is 
treated as T. The tackle must always be at the ball, otherwise it may be illegal and 
often punished by the referee, especially if the player makes contact with his 
opponent before the ball, or makes unfair contact with the player after playing the 
ball.  
Very often, teams which use T frequently, play a man-to-man marking, i.e. when 
certain defenders who are responsible to guard a particular opponent are forced into 
that action, because they are dispossessed or are slower than the opponents. Man-to-
man marking is particularly effective when the team has a sweeper who has a free 
role and supports his teammates who are dispossessed or having problems with the 
opponents.  
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Only T at less than approximately 15 meters outside the defendant team’s penalty 
area is counted. Tackling (and head-nicks as well) from free kicks and corners are 
also counted, because in these cases, the defenders play the man-to-man tactic. On 
the other hand, SG, CA, AP and D stopped by unjust T and punished by the referee, 
does not count.  
According to these criteria, FCB defenders had 6 successful T against SG, 8 against 
CA, 6 against AP and 8 against D. Similarly ACM had, 4, 9, 8 and 7 successful T 
respectively.  
(vi) zone marking (ZM) 
In ZM every defender and the defensive midfielders too, are responsible to cover a 
particular zone on the pitch to hinder the opponent players from SG, AP, D or CA 
into their area. In a perfect ZM, there are two lines of defenders, usually with four 
players in the first and at least three in the second line, covering roughly the one half 
of the pitch. A successful ZM requires that every defender fulfills his duties, 
communicates with his teammates, covers all empty spaces and synchronizes his 
movement. In that case, the defensive line can exploit the offside rules and prevent 
the success of long-balls, CA, AP, D and SG. Bad communication from the defenders 
though can be very decisive, especially if the opponents have very quick attackers 
who can dribble, pass and shot equally well.  
Since measuring ZM is very difficult, the following conditions are applied to simplify 
that tactic.  
The two lines of defenders should be placed at about less than 10 and 20 meters 
respectively, outside the defendant team’s penalty area, i.e. ZM near the middle of 
the pitch does not count. (Normally, ZM near the middle of the pitch is observed 
when the team controls the ball through passes or when it attacks). 
To differentiate the ZM from the T, the own defender(s) should be at least 4-5 meters 
away from their offensive player(s) when he (they) intercepted the ball. 
Despite the fact that offside positions are the result of a good ZM, do not count. 
Precisely as in T, unjust actions by ZM do not count.  
According to these conditions, FCB defenders had 5 successful ZM against SG, 6 
against CA, 7 against AP and 10 against D. Similarly ACM had, 9, 7, 6 and 10 
successful ZM respectively. 
The payoff of the game for all six strategies is depicted in the Table 1 below. Notice 
that some entries are empty because both teams can’t play simultaneously offensive 
or defensive. When one team attacks (defends) the other team will defend (attack). 
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The first entry refers to FCB and the second entry to ACM. Consequently, since the 
payoff from a team’s offensive strategy is not equal to the negative payoff from the 
other team’s defensive strategy, the game is a non-zero sum and the payoff matrix is 
bi-matrix. 
 Table 1: The payoff matrix 
a1 = SG; a2 = CA; a3 = AP; a4 = D; a5 = T; a6 = ZM; b1 = SG; b2 = CA; b3 = AP; b4 = D; b5 = T; b6 = 
ZM 
There seem to be some doubtful pairs, where the defensive values are higher than the 
offensive ones, such as (a4, b6). How can 8 D be defended by 10 ZM? Simply, some D 
which counts was defended occasionally by a ZM which also counts; the ball is then 
lost to the offensive player who tried to dribble again, but failed. Consequently, the 
new D attempt does not count while the new ZM does.  
Notice also that there are no pure dominant strategies. But, despite the fact that there 
are no pure dominant strategies, FCB gets more points than ACM from the match. 
For instance, FCB had 17 AP, (a3), in comparison with ACM which had only 13, (b3). 
As a whole, FCB beats ACM in six offensive-defensive pairs by a total of 11 points, is 
beaten by ACM in five pairs, by 8 points, while in five pairs there is a tie. The highest 
differences in favor of FCB are in (a3, b5), i.e. when FCB plays its AP and ACM does 
not succeed with its defensive T, and in (a5, b4), when ACM tries with its D but FCB 
defends successfully with its T. 
3. Models 
 
In this section I will present four deterministic models, one chance constrained, one 
possibilistic and one fuzzy LP. Five of them are formulated separately for each team 
and two simultaneously for both teams.  
 
3.1 Classical Optimization 
 
 
 
A = FC 
Barcelona 
(FCB) 
B = AC Milan (ACM) ∑FCB  
  Offensive Defensive  
b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6  
 
Offensive 
a1 0 0 0 0 5, 4 9, 9 14 
a2 0 0 0 0 8, 9 7, 7 15 
a3 0 0 0 0 11, 8 6, 6 17 
a4 0 0 0 0 6, 7 8, 10 14 
Defensive a5 6, 6 8, 7 6, 8 8, 5 0 0 28 
a6 5, 7 6, 6 7, 5 10, 9 0 0 28 
∑ACM    13 13 13 14 28 32  
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Let A and B represent FCB and ACM respectively, their respective six strategies ai 
and bj, with (0, 1) bounds.  Each team maximizes separately the sum of its payoffs 
times the product of ai and bj of the relevant strategy pairs. As a consequence, the 
objective functions given below, are non-linear.  
 
Two models have been formulated: (a) unrestricted, i.e. the sum of all six strategies is 
equal to unit; (b) restricted, i.e. both offensive and defensive strategies must be 
played. Consequently, in model (b) the two conditions ,1,1
6
1
6
1
== ∑∑
== j
j
i
i ba are 
modified into the four: 1,1,1,1 654321654321 =+=+++=+=+++ bbbbbbaaaaaa  
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Model (b) 3:  
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43214321
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bbbbaaaa
 
 
This formulation ensures that team A for instance, will receive its respective payoffs 
from its offensive strategy a3, provided that team B will play its b5 and/or its b6. In 
fact, when team A or B maximize, both strategies bj and ai are decided 
simultaneously. Obviously, without the strategies of the other team, the objective 
function would be trivial or even erroneous since the highest payoff strategy would 
not be ensured. 
     3.2 Max-min 
 
Let v1 be the minimal value from all four offensive strategies and v2 is the minimal 
value from both defensive strategies for FCB. Similarly, let z1 and z2, be the respective 
minimal values for ACM. Each team maximizes separately the sum of these minimal 
respective values. Again, the model is non-linear because each one of the offensive 
                                                           
3 In order to save space, model (b) will be excluded in all subsequent formulations. 
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(defensive) strategies of one team is multiplied by the defensive (offensive) strategies 
of the other team.  
Model (a) 
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3.3 LP formulation with complementary conditions  
While the first two models assume that teams optimize separately, we turn now to a 
simultaneously optimal decisions. Normally, for a bimatrix game with many 
strategies, it is rather difficult to find a solution that is simultaneously optimal for 
both teams. We can define an equilibrium stable set of strategies though, i.e. the well 
known Nash equilibrium. In the following two sections I will formulate two models 
to find the Nash equilibrium.  
As is known, the max-min strategy is defined as: 
 , . . ,  	 
 max,.., min,..,  , . . , , , . . ,  , . . ,  	 
 max,.., min,..,  , . . , , , . . ,  
A standard model to find a max-min to both teams is to use a simultaneous LP, with 
complementary conditions. The complementary conditions are to set the product of 
each one of the six respective slack, times the six respective strategies, equal to zero. 
According to this formulation, both teams behave symmetrically, since they 
maximize their own minimal payoffs obtained from their own selected strategies. 
Compared to the previous models, each team selects now only its own strategies. 
 
Notice also the two extra constraints, which ensure that both teams can’t play 
entirely offensively or defensively4. For instance, the upper bound for all offensive 
                                                           
4 Without these additional constraints, both teams played offensively; FCB plays 55.55% SG 
and 44.45% AP, while ACM plays 57.14% AP and 42.86% D.  
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strategies is set arbitrarily equal to 1.2 and the lower bound for the defensive 
strategies is set arbitrarily equal to 0.8. 
Model (a) 
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3.4 Nash strategies 
As is known in the Nash equilibrium, each team selects its probability mixture of 
strategies (or pure strategy) to maximize its payoff, conditional on the other team’s 
selected probability mixture (or pure). The probability mixture of a team is the best 
response to the other team’s probability mixture. Consequently, the   , . . , , , . . ,  is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the following 
conditions:  
, . . ,  , , . . ,    , . . , , , . . ,  , . . ,  ! " ,161 =∑=i ia0 $ % $ 1, ' 	 1, . . ,6) 
, . . , , , . . ,    , . . ,  , , . . ,  , . . ,  ! *
+ ,16
1
=∑
=j
jb
0 $ , $ 1, - 	 1, . . ,6.
/ 
It is also known that, if min-max and Nash equilibria coincide, the game has a saddle 
point. Such saddle points are rather frequent in zero-sum games but not in bi-matrix 
non-zero sum games. 
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I appied the package by Dickhaut & Kaplan (1993) programmed in Mathematica, to 
find the Nash equilibria. In model (a) the entire payoff matrix was used. In model (b) 
I used two sub-matrices; when FCB (ACM) was playing offensively and ACM (FCB) 
defensively.  
 
3.5 Chance-Constrained Programming (CCP) 
When teams are uncertain about competitors’ actions or about the payoff matrix, 
games become very complex. According to Carlton & Perloff (2005) much of the 
current research in game theory is undertaken on games with uncertainty. I move 
now to some more plausible models and modify the deterministic parameters and 
constraints. 
 
In CCP the parameters of the constraints are random variables and the constraints 
are valid with some (minimum) probability.  
Let us assume that the deterministic parameters are expected values, independent 
and normally distributed random variables with the means as previously, and 
variances5 given in Table 2. The first entry depicts the variance for FCB and the 
second for ACM.  
Table 2: The variance of the payoff matrix 
 
Moreover, in CCP, when we maximize for one team, we assume that the other team’s 
values are deterministic and disregard their variance. We also assume that, Josep 
Guardiola, the manager of FCB, might expect that the probability of the expected 
value of his team’s defensive strategies a5 and a6 is at least 90%, while the probability 
of all four expected values of offensive strategies, a1, a2, a3 and a4 is at least 95%.  
                                                           
5 The variances of the payoffs are obviously very subjective and are given just to show the 
formulation of the model. Moreover, based on my numerous playing back of the match, the 
variances reflect rather well the uncertainty of the respective payoffs. 
 
 
 
 
A = FC 
Barcelona 
(FCB) 
  B = AC Milan (ACM) 
Offensive Defensive 
1
2bσ  22bσ  32bσ  4
2bσ  52bσ  62bσ  
 
Offensive 
1
2
aσ  0 0 0 0 9, 10 17, 12 
2
2
aσ  0 0 0 0 16, 15 15, 13 
3
2aσ  0 0 0 0 17, 14 10, 11 
4
2
aσ  0 0 0 0 13, 13 15, 14 
 
Defensive 
5
2aσ  10, 9 12, 11 15, 15 11, 12 0 0 
6
2aσ  10, 12 11, 10 14, 13 16, 16 0 0 
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The first stochastic constraint is now formulated as:  
{ }








+++
+++−
=−≥+++≤
2
4
2
3
2
2
2
1
543211
543211
1317169
)61185(1)61185(
aaaa
baaaavFbaaaavP α , 
where, F is the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. If F 
(K) is the standard normal value such that F (K ) = 1 - , then the above constraint 
reduces to: ( )αK
aaaa
baaaav ≥








+++
+++−
2
4
2
3
2
2
2
1
543211
1317169
)61185(  
Given 10.0=α , the constraint is simplified to:  
1
2
4
2
3
2
2
2
154321 1317169282.1)61185( vaaaabaaaa ≥+++++++  
Similarly, given 05.0=α , the first defensive constraint is modified to: 
2
2
6
2
5165 1010645.1)56( vaabaa ≥+++  
So, the CCP model (a) for FCB is:   
6,...,1,10,6,..,1,10
,1,1
1611645.1)108(
1415645.1)76(
1112645.1)68(
1010645.1)56(
15101517282.1)8679(
1317169282.1)61185(..
max
6
1
6
1
2
2
6
2
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2
2
6
2
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2
2
6
2
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2
2
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2
5165
1
2
4
2
3
2
2
2
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1
2
4
2
3
2
2
2
154321
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A similar formulation applies for ACM, assuming that its manager Massimiliano 
Allegri expects that the probability of the expected value of his team’s defensive 
strategies b5 and b6 is also at least 90%, while the probability of all four offensive 
strategies, b1, b2, b3 and b4 is at least 95%. Allegri also treats Barcelona’s values as 
deterministic and therefore the problem is formulated similarly. 
3.6 A Possibilistic LP (PLP) model 
No matter how well one has defined and measured the six variables, the observed 
payoffs are still rather ambiguous.  
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The ambiguity of measured values can be restricted by a symmetric triangular fuzzy 
number, determined by a center cia , and a spread iaw , respectively
c
jb , and jbw  which is 
represented as:
ia
c
ii w,A α= , respectively jb
c
jj wbB ,= . For instance, the estimate of 
CA for FCB, when teams play (a2, b5), can be restricted by a fuzzy number 5,2A with the 
following membership function: 







 −
−=
3
8
1,0max)(
5,2
x
xAµ . Thus, the center is 8 (i.e. the 
initial value), its upper value is 11 and its lower value is 5. Consequently, that fuzzy 
CA variable is expressed as: 3,85,2 =A .  
In addition to that, we can use possibility measures in order to measure to what 
extent it is possible that the possibilistic values, restricted by the possibility 
distribution 
jiA ,
µ ,  are at least or at most equal to some certain values.  
I will follow Inuiguchi & Ramik, (2000) who used possibility and/or necessity 
measures to de-fuzzify a fuzzy LP.  
Given two fuzzy sets, F and Z, and a possibility distribution µF  of a possibilistic 
variable κ, the possibility measure is defined as: 
))(),(min(sup)( xxZ ZF
r
F µµ=Π  
If ],( gZ −∞= , i.e. Z is a deterministic (non-fuzzy) set of real numbers not larger than g, 
the possibility index is defined as: ( ) ( ]( ) { }gxxggPos FF ≤=∞−Π=≤ )(sup, µκ   
If [ )∞+= ,gZ , the respective possibility index is defined as: 
( ) [ )( ) { }grxggPos FF ≥=∞+Π=≥ )(sup, µκ  
The necessity measures measure to what extent it is certain that the possibilistic 
values, restricted by the possibility distribution µF , are at least or at most some certain 
values.  
The necessity measures and the necessity index are similarly defined as: 
))(),(1max(inf)( xxZN ZF
r
F µµ−=  
( ) ( ]( ) { }gxxgNgNes FF f)(sup1, µκ −=∞−=≤  
( ) [ )( ) { }gxxgNgNes FF p)(sup1, µκ −=∞+=≥  
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In my estimates, I assume a spread equal to 3 for the most “fuzzy” measures, CA, D 
and ZM, equal to 2 for AP and equal to 1, for the less “fuzzy” value, SG. Thus, I use 
the following fuzzy sets: 
3,10,3,6,3,7,3,9,2,7,2,8,2,9,2,4
3,9,3,5,2,5,2,8,3,6,3,7,1,7,1,6
3,10,3,7,3,6,3,5,2,8,2,6,2,8,2,6
3,8,3,6,2,6,2,11,3,7,3,8,1,9,1,5
4,63,62,61,64,53,52,51,5
6,45,46,35,36,25,26,15,1
4,63,62,61,64,53,52,51,5
6,45,46,35,36,25,26,15,1
========
========
========
========
BBBBBBBB
BBBBBBBB
AAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAA
 
I will also make the right-hand side parameters ambiguous and use only possible 
measures. I assume that the certainty degrees of both defensive strategies being at 
least equal to 0.5, is not less than 60%. Similarly I assume that the certainty degrees of 
all four offensive strategies being at least equal to 2, is not less than 90%. These 
bounds apply to both teams and are very moderate compared to the deterministic 
estimates from the previous models.  
Given the symmetric triangular fuzzy values, and the assumptions above, the PLP 
model (a) for FCB is: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A similar formulation applies for ACM. 
3.7 Van Hop’s Fuzzy LP model 
Let us finally make both left-and right-hand side parameters fuzzy. Van Hop (2007) 
formulated a Fuzzy LP model, using superiority and inferiority measures. 
Given two fuzzy numbers, ),,(~),,,(~ dcvZbauF ==  where, )v,u(  = central values and
)Rd,c,b,a( ∈ , i.e. the left and right spreads respectively, and if ,~~ ZF ≤  
the superiority of Z~ overF~ is defined as: 
2
)~,~( bduvFZSup −+−= , 
and the inferiority of F~ to Z~ be defined as: 
2
)~,~( cauvZFInf −+−= . 
6,...,1,10,6,..,1,10,1,1
5.0)32(6.0)108(
5.0)32(6.0)76(
5.0)32(6.0)68(
5.0)32(6.0)56(
2)323(9.0)8679(
2)323(9.0)61185(..
max
6
1
6
1
4652465
3652365
2652265
1652165
64321164321
54321154321
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Similarly, given two triangular fuzzy random variables B
~
A
~
≤ , the superiority of B
~
over A
~
is defined as: 
2
)w(b)w(d)w(u)w(v)A~,B~(Sup −+−= , and the inferiority of A~
toB
~
be defined as: 
2
)w(c)w(a)w(u)w(v)B~,A~(Inf −+−= . 
Let us now assume the following symmetric triangular type, fuzzy random 
parameters.  
The four offensive fuzzy parameters (for FCB) are: 
( ) { }{ }{ }{ }{ }[ ]{ }{ }{ }{ }{ }[ ]







=
=
=
2.2~,1~1~,7ˆ,8~,2~1~,9~,0~1~,0~1~,6~)~,~(
2~,8~,6~,6~,1~1~,7~,8~,9~,5~)~,~(
~
,
~
2,12,1
1,11,1
11
ww
ww
vA
vA
vA , with 25.0)(,75.0)( 21 == wpwp  
Notice that the first row is identical to the respective deterministic values (first 
entries of Table 1) and has a probability of 75%. In order to be consistent with the 
PLP model previously, we assume that the fuzzy{ }2~ , is the expected value above the 
minimum value v1. The second row consists of the respective “fuzzy” variables and 
has a lower probability. 
Similarly, the two defensive fuzzy parameters (again for FCB only) are: 
( )
{ }{ }[ ]
{ }{ }[ ]
{ }{ }[ ]
{ }{ }[ ]








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


=
=
=
=
=
7.0~,4~1~,9~,9~,7~)~,~(
5.0~,0~1~,7~,6~,5~)~,~(
7.0~,9~,8~,8~,7~)~,~(
5.0~,8~,6~,8~,6~)~,~(
~
,
~
2,22,2
1,21,2
2,22,2
1,21,2
22
ww
ww
ww
ww
vA
vA
vA
vA
vA , with 25.0)(,75.0)( 21 == wpwp  
Notice that in this matrix, the first and third rows are the respective deterministic 
values from Table 1, while the second and fourth rows are the true “fuzzy” ones.  
In order to be consistent with the symmetric triangular fuzzy values in the PLP 
model previously, we keep the same spreads. Thus, we have the following fuzzy 
numbers:  
3
,2
,1
4,63,62,61,66,45,46,25,2
4,63,62,61,66,45,46,25,24,53,52,5
1,56,35,34,53,52,51,56,35,36,15,16,15,1
22222222
11111111222
2221111112211
========
===========
=============
AAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAA
µµµµµµµµ
µµµµµµµµµµµ
µµµµµµµµµµµµµ
 
Finally, based on the fuzzy numbers above, we construct an average fuzzy number 
for the respective offensive and defensive constraints, such as: (a1, a2, a3, a4) = (b1, b2, 
b3, b4) = (1+3+2+3)/4 = 2.25 and (a5, a6) = (b5, b6) = (2+3)/2 = 2.5  
Following Van Hop, the corresponding LP model (a) for FCB is: 
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A similar formulation applies for ACM. 
4. Results 
 
The unrestricted offensive and defensive strategies, model (a), are presented in Table 
3 and the restricted ones, model (b), are presented in Table 4. The maximizing team is 
in bald and the other team in italics. In LP with complementary constraints and in the 
Nash, both teams maximize and are in bald.  
In classical optimization model (a), both teams play pure strategies, FCB receives 10 
points and ACM 9. It is rather surprising because FCB plays defensively and ACM 
plays offensively, no matter which team maximizes. In both cases, FCB plays ZM and 
ACM plays D, (a6 = b4 = 1).  
  
In model (b), the strategies change. When FCB maximizes, it plays the pure strategies 
AP and ZM (a3 = a6 = 1) and receives 21, under the condition that ACM plays also its 
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pure strategies T and D, (b5 = b4 = 1). When ACM maximizes, it receives 17, by 
playing AP and T, (b3 = b5 = 1), given that FCB plays T and CA, (a5 = a2 = 1)6. 
 
In the maximization of the minimum payoffs, model (a), both teams use mixed 
offensive strategies when they maximize separately. When FCB maximizes, it gets 
3.95 points, if it plays offensively (75.45% AP and 24.55% SG) and ACM plays 
defensively (58.58% ZM and 41.42% T). Similarly, when ACM maximizes, it gets 3.37 
points when it also plays offensively (42.71% AP and 57.29% D) and FCB plays 
defensively (46.28% ZM and 53.72% T).  
 
In model (b), when FCB maximizes, it continues with the same offensive game but it 
plays 100% T as well. Given the fact that ACM continues with the same defensive 
game and almost equally balanced with all the offensive strategies, FCB gets 3.95 + 
1.71 = 5.66 points. When ACM maximizes, it continues with almost the same weights 
in AP and D, and also plays almost 97% ZM and 3% T. Since FCB continues with the 
same mixture in defense, and also with all four offensive ones, with AP just above 
30%, ACM gets 3.37 + 1.92 = 5.29 points. 
 
In the LP with complementary constraints model (a), FCB plays mainly defensively 
(almost 80% T) and ACM almost offensively (51.87% SG and 45.8% CA), with two 
positive slacks (sla4 = 1.59, sla6 = 1.59), giving ACM more points than FCB!  
 
In model (b), FCB mixes two offensive strategies (55.55% SG and 44.45% AP) and 
plays also 100% T. ACM shifts strategies by playing 50% SG and 50% CA, and also 
mixing its defensive strategies, with more weights in ZM. FCB gets more points from 
its offensive strategies (v1 = 7.67, v2 = 6), while ACM gets slightly more points from its 
defensive strategies (z1 = 6.5, z2 = 6.68). Notice though that in this case there are five 
positive slacks, sla4 = 2, sla6 = 2, slb4 = 1.25, slb5 = 0.25, slb6 = 1.93. 
In Nash, model (a), Mathematica found seven equilibria, with three of them being 
pure strategies and four mixed ones. The three pure strategies and one of the four 
mixed ones are identical in model (b) as well. Notice also that the pure strategies 
Nash equilibrium (a6 = b4 = 1) is identical with the solution from the classical 
optimization when FCB maximizes and is the only one where ACM plays offensively. 
Apart from the Nash payoff (9, 9), in all other equilibria FCB gets more points than 
ACM, with the largest difference (11, 8) when FCB plays 100% AP and ACM defends 
with 100% T. In another Nash equilibrium, (4.74, 4.5), the difference is approximately 
5% in favor of FCB.  That equilibrium is found if FCB plays 50% its a1 and 50% its a6, 
while ACM plays 52.63% its b6 and 47.37% its b4. In that case the product for FCB is: 
                                                           
6 Notice that ACM would also receive 17 points too if it accepted the solution in which FCB 
maximizes, i.e. (a3 = a6 = 1) and (b5 = b4 = 1). 
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(0.5*0.5263*9) + (0.5*0.4737*10) = 4.74. Similarly the product for ACM is: 
(0.5*0.5263*9) + (0.5*0.4737*9) = 4.50. 
 
Table 3: Unrestricted offensive and defensive strategies 
Model 
(a) 
Team v1 ; 
v2 
z1 ; 
z2 
Offensive strategies Defensive  
SG CA AP D T ZM 
Classic 
Opt. 
FCB 
ACM 
10 -     
1 
 1 
ACM 
FCB 
- 9    1   
1 
 
 
Max-min 
of 
payoffs 
FCB 
 
ACM 
3.95; 
0 
- 
- 
0.2455  0.7545    
- -     0.4142 0.5858 
ACM 
 
FCB 
- 
- 
3.37; 
0 
  0.4271 0.5729   
- -     0.5372 0.4628 
LP & 
Compl. 
Constr. 
FCB 1.56; 
4.78 
- 
- 
0.1128  0.0902  0.7970  
ACM - 
- 
6.48; 
0.02 
0.5187 0.4580 0.0203  0.0015 0.0015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nash 
FCB 
ACM 
10  
9 
  
 
  
1 
 1 
FCB 
ACM 
5.24  
4.24 
  0.5294  
0.5238 
 
0.4762 
0.4706 
FCB 
ACM 
11  
8 
  1   
1 
 
FCB 
ACM 
4.34  
3.89 
0.1622  0.4054  
0.4340 
 
0.1887 
0.4324 
0.3773 
FCB 
ACM 
7.67  
6.86 
0.2857  0.7143   
0.3333 
 
0.6666 
FCB 
ACM 
4.74  
4.5 
0.5    
0.4736 
 0.5 
0.5263 
FCB 
ACM 
9  
9 
1      
1 
 
 
CCP 
 
 
 
FCB 
 
ACM 
8.77; 
0 
- 
- 
 1   
 
 
 
 
 
- -     0.4558 0.5442 
ACM 
 
FCB 
- 
- 
7.49; 
0.04 
 0.0456 0.0427 0.9038 
 
0.0078 
 
 
 
- -     0.6695 0.3305 
 
 
PLP 
FCB 
 
ACM 
3.05; 
-0.5 
- 
- 
 0.6287 0.2594 0.1119   
- -     0.4582 0.5418 
ACM 
 
FCB 
- 
- 
2.47; 
-0.63 
0.0022 0.9278 0.0640 0.0031  0.0029 
- -     0.4620 0.5380 
 
 
 
Fuzzy 
FCB 
 
0.88; 
1.22 
- 
- 
    0.9891 0.0109 
ACM - - 0.2817 0.2193 0.2808 0.2182   
ACM 
 
- 
- 
0.88; 
1.56 
    1  
FCB - - 0.2199 0.2716 0.3078 0.2007   
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Table 4: Restricted offensive and defensive strategies 
Model 
(b) 
Team v1 ; 
v2 
z1 ; 
z2 
Offensive strategies Defensive 
strategies 
SG CA AP D T ZM 
Classic 
Opt. 
FCB 
ACM 
21 -   1  
1 
 
1 
1 
ACM 
FCB 
- 17   
1 
1  1 
1 
 
 
 
 
Max-min 
of 
payoffs 
FCB 
 
ACM 
3.95; 
1.71 
- 
- 
0.2455  0.7545  1  
- - 0.2857 0.2143 0.2857 0.2143 0.4142 0.5858 
ACM 
 
FCB 
- 
- 
3.37; 
1.92 
  0.4323 0.5677 0.0314 0.9686 
- - 0.2172 0.2720 0.3168 0.1939 0.5372 0.4628 
LP & 
Compl. 
Constr. 
FCB 7.67; 
6.00 
- 
- 
0.5555  0.4445  1  
ACM - 
- 
6.50; 
6.68 
0.50 0.50   0.4642 0.5358 
NASH 
FCB: 
offensive 
ACM: 
defensive 
FCB 
ACM 
11  
8 
  
 
1   
1 
 
FCB 
ACM 
7.67  
6.86 
0.2857  0.7142  
 
 
0.3333 
 
0.6666 
FCB 
ACM 
9  
9 
1     
 
 
1 
ACM: off  
BFC: def 
FCB 
ACM 
10  
9 
    
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
CCP 
FCB 
 
ACM 
8.37; 
7.36 
- 
- 
  1  
 
 
 
1 
 
- - 0.4319 0.3176 0.1723 0.0781 0.2805 0.7195 
ACM 
 
FCB 
- 
- 
7.38; 
7.35 
 1   1 
 
 
 
- - 0.5379 0.1091 0.1498 0.2032 0.4463 0.5537 
 
 
PLP 
FCB 
 
ACM 
3.09; 
1.61 
- 
- 
 1    1 
- - 0.3105 0.2707 0.2399 0.1789 0.4755 0.5255 
ACM 
 
FCB 
- 
- 
2.70; 
1.89 
 0.4165 0.5835   1 
- - 0.2209 0.2711 0.3058 0.2022 0.5505 0.4495 
 
 
Fuzzy 
FCB 
 
ACM 
5.36; 
1.22 
- 
- 
0.9841 0.0159   0.9891 0.0109 
- - 0.2817 0.2193 0.2808 0.2182 0.4705 0.5295 
ACM 
 
FCB 
- 
- 
4.96; 
1.56 
 0.3535  0.6465 1  
- - 0.2199 0.2716 0.3078 0.2007 0.5671 0.4329 
 
 
In CCP model (a), when FCB maximizes, it plays 100% CA provided that ACM 
defends by 45.58% with T and 54.42% by ZM, giving FCB 8.77 points.  On the other 
hand, when ACM maximizes, it mixes four strategies, with D dominating by 90.38%, 
given that FCB defends by about 2/3 T and 1/3 ZM, and giving ACM 8.53 points, i.e. 
a rather balanced game. 
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In model (b), both teams shift strategies. When FCB maximizes, it plays 100% AP and 
100% ZM, while ACM plays all six strategies with changes in defense weights. When 
ACM maximizes, it shifts to two pure strategies, 100% CA and 100% T, while FCB 
plays all six strategies too and changes also its defense weights. In this model, the 
offensive strategies give 8.37 points to FCB and 7.38 points to ACM. On the other 
hand, both teams get almost the same points (7.36 versus 7.35) from their defensive 
strategies. 
 
In PLP model (a), the results are rather similar as in CCP. Both teams, when they 
maximize, mix their offensive strategies, with most weights in CA. Both teams mix 
also their defensive strategies (with almost identical weights) when the other team 
maximizes. FCB gets 3.05 and ACM 2.47 points. Notice though the two negative 
values in the defensive strategies, v2 = - 0.5 and z2 = - 0.63, indicating that the 
certainty degree of defensive strategies being at least equal to 0.5, should not be less 
than 60%, is violated. For ACM, the additional - 0.13 is explained by the fact that b6 = 
0.0029. On the other hand, the certainty degrees of all four offensive strategies being 
at least equal to 2, should not be less than 90%, is valid. 
 
In PLP, model (b), both certainty degrees are satisfied. Both teams, when they 
maximize, play 100% ZM, FCB plays also 100% CA, while ACM mixes its CA with 
AP. When one team maximizes, the other team mixes all six strategies, with roughly 
similar weights.  FCB gets 3.09 + 1.61 = 4.7 points, while ACM gets 2.70 + 1.89 = 4.59 
points, again a rather balanced game. 
 
Finally, in Fuzzy model (a), both teams, play similar strategies when they maximize, 
100% T for ACM and almost 99% for FCB, and mix all four offensive strategies, with 
almost similar weights, when the other team maximizes. They get the same points 
from their offensive strategies, but ACM gets more points than BFC from its pure 
defensive strategy T. 
 
In Fuzzy, model (b), while the strategies from model (a) remain unchanged, FCB 
plays 98.4% SG, 1.6% CA and ACM mixes about 1/3 CA and 2/3 D. Both teams mix 
also their defensive strategies when the other team maximizes. Again ACM gets 0.34 
more points from its T, while FCB gets 0.40 more points from its offensive strategies, 
leading to almost balanced game.   
 
Notice that in all fuzzy models all inferior lambdas are positive, varying between 
1.52 and 2.9. 
 
In general, the “average” strategies from all models (a) are: FCB plays about 57% 
offensively, i.e. about 23% AP, 19% SG and 14% CA. Its highest weight though is in 
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defense, ZM with about 28%. ACM plays more offensively, 61.8%, mainly through 
41% D, and by about 12% CA. ACM balances its defensive strategies, by about 21% 
ZM and 17% T. The closest to these averages is the Nash equilibrium that gives FCB 
4.34 points and ACM 3.89 points. Similarly, the “average” strategies from all models 
(b) are: FCB plays about 54.6% AP, 34.1% SG and 11.3% CA offensively and 42.7% T 
and 57.3% ZM defensively; ACM plays 32.4% CA, 31.6% D, 28.8% AP and 7.2% SG 
offensively and 53.7% T and 46.3% ZM defensively. 
 
Conclusions 
A number of deterministic and stochastic models where used to find out the optimal 
offensive and defensive strategies that FCB and ACM could have applied during 
their UEFA CL match, based on the selected match statistics. Since FCB won the 
match, the question posed was if ACM could have done better by following better 
strategies.  
 
Despite the fact that the optimal strategies vary with the selected model, there are 
indeed four different strategies that ACM could have selected according to the 
following models: (i) in fuzzy model (a) ACM gets 16% more points than FCB, if it 
plays purely defensive, i.e. 100% T; (ii) in LP with complementary constraints model 
(a) ACM gets 2.5 % more points, if it plays offensively, i.e. 52% SG and 46% CA; (iii) 
in one Nash equilibrium where both teams get 9 points, if it plays 100% ZM in order 
to defend the 100% SG played by FCB; (iv) in fuzzy model (b) where ACM gets 1% 
less points than FCB, if it plays 100% T in defense and also 35.4% CA and 64.6% D in 
offense.   
 
On the other hand, ACM does it badly with the following strategies: (i) in PLP model 
(a), if it relies mainly to CA (by 93%) with almost no defense; (ii) in one Nash 
equilibrium when FCB plays 100% AP and ACM 100% T; (iii) in another Nash 
equilibrium when FCB plays 53% AP and 47% ZM while ACM plays 52.4% D and 
47.6% T; (iv) in classical maximization model (b), if both teams play 100% AP, and 
also FCB plays 100% ZM while ACM plays 100% T.  
So the final suggestion to ACM is: When both teams maximize simultaneously, play 
offensively, start with counter-attacks with finish with shots on goal. FCB would try 
with tackling, but not with high success. On the other hand, excessive CA if it is not 
followed by SG should be avoided since FCB can mix its two defensive strategies 
successfully. If FCB plays mainly its amazing passing game or its SG, defend with 
ZM instead of T.  
I leave it open to the readers, the funs and the managers to conclude if ACM’s defeat 
can be explained because it did not followed the suggested strategies above. 
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